ReSatoshi Android wallet threat model and known limits

Protected paths
Native SecureRandom with no weak fallback; physical dice alternative; local key
storage and fresh device authorization; optional password-encrypted backups;
TLS hostname and genesis validation; raw txid/script/value checks; PSBT ownership,
change/fee checks; explicit signing and broadcast confirmation; background lock.

Trust and limits
In default server mode, the selected Electrum server sees IP/script queries and can omit/falsify chain
status. Header PoW, ASERT, Merkle inclusion and full-chain validation are absent in server mode.
Correct genesis/raw transaction IDs do not prove honest history or confirmations.
The watch-only and detected-payment UI explicitly states this server
trust boundary. These disclosures are not independent chain verification.
Optional full-node mode independently validates through the pinned Core node.
It uses watch-only descriptors and authenticated loopback RPC. Local RPC/IBD,
wallet scan, genesis, reorganization and mempool failures block local use; there
is no automatic server fallback. The Core public wallet DB is not encrypted;
it contains public keys and history, never app private keys. Public node data
may remain after deleting the signing wallet. Physical-device lifecycle and
resource validation remain required; see FULLNODE-PROTOTYPE.txt.
Private keys are not transmitted, but compromised OS/runtime/camera/clipboard,
physical access and supply-chain compromise remain risks. JS strings containing
secrets cannot be reliably zeroed. Android secure storage may be software-backed;
the current minimum permits it and does not require StrongBox/hardware backing.
Fresh native authorization plus Keychain may prompt twice on some Android devices;
removing one without testing would weaken the current authorization design.
Public-key QR exposes address/transaction relationships, not a sender identity.
The QR checksum is not authentication. Never infer airgap from an in-app screen:
the user must keep the signing device disconnected.

Known performance/compatibility limits
Full recovery scans all 2000 change addresses; ordinary refresh uses previously
used ranges plus gap20, bounded by 2000. A new distant change address used by
another device may remain invisible until manual full recovery. See
RECOVERY.txt. Public discovery hints (indices, full-scan time/height, account hash)
are stored locally; no balance is trusted from disk. Tampering can affect search
coverage, not authorize spending. Manual full recovery bypasses window selection.
The last full change-address search time is shown beside watch-only results;
the hot wallet offers manual full recovery in Settings. Search
timestamps are untrusted local metadata and do not certify completeness.
Batching is bounded to 32 read requests; explicit unsupported-batch errors fall
back to individual reads. Broadcast is never automatically retried. Very large
histories, server limits and mobile-network performance remain release checks.
Formats v1/v2/v3 remain readable; v3 is password-encrypted while optional-password
wallets currently use v2 inside Android secure storage. Do not delete compatibility
until existing phone wallets, backups and migration/reset consent are settled.
Custom QR envelopes, fixed derivation and P2WPKH-only signing restrict compatibility.
RBF/fee bumping and locktime anti-fee-sniping are not implemented. No public
backend or physical two-device tests have been completed. Local automation is not
a claim that UI, camera, credentials, recovery or mainnet operation are validated.
